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ANFET Editorial — February 12, 2026
For more than thirty years, Eritrea’s opposition has experimented with every imaginable organizational model. Some were bold, some improvised, and many were born out of genuine public desperation for change. But the result has been the same: overlapping structures, duplicated mandates, and a leadership landscape too fragmented to carry national weight.
Today, the only consistently functional platform is the coordinated diplomatic work of the Eritrean Political Forces (EPF), the Eritrean National Council for Democratic Change (ENCDC), and the Eritrean Coalition for Democratic Change (ECDC). Their joint engagement with the European Union, IGAD, and the African Union—backed by seasoned Eritrean diplomats—remains the opposition’s most credible asset. It is an asset worth protecting.
Yet while political organizations were trying to build institutional continuity, the diaspora was swept by two massive civic mobilizations: Yiakel and Brigade N’Hamedu (BNH). Both movements emerged from legitimate frustration. Both energized thousands. And both, unintentionally, created structural problems that now demand correction.
Yiakel: A Movement That Grew Too Fast, Too Wide
Yiakel’s rise—driven largely from North America—was explosive. Its global framework was ambitious, but it leaned heavily on one region’s human and financial resources. Political organizations poured in members and logistical support, helping the movement expand across Europe and North America.
But the model came with consequences:
Institutional Drain: Political organizations lost active members to Yiakel, weakening their own internal capacity.
Governance Confusion: Yiakel’s global leadership began to overshadow political organizations, creating the impression that formal political actors were no longer essential.
Parallel Chains of Command: Global, regional, and city-level bodies created a maze of authority that made coordination nearly impossible.
The result was predictable: a movement too large to manage and too fragmented to guide a national strategy.
BNH: A Movement Pulled in Too Many Directions
BNH faced similar structural turbulence. The creation of global, regional, and Ethiopia-based “Baito Addis Ababa” bodies produced competing authorities and inconsistent mandates. Even the involvement of prominent artists—figures who could have unified the movement—became a source of tension due to miscommunication and outside influence.
Other challenges quickly surfaced:
External Interference: Ethiopian government engagement, especially around Red Sea security, raised concerns about autonomy.
Polarized Narratives: Media personalities and informal advisers fueled mistrust between civic movements and political organizations.
Misinterpreted Support: Financial assistance from Yiakel was framed as political interference/hijacking, deepening internal fractures.
BNH’s experience underscored a simple truth: civic energy cannot substitute for clear, disciplined structure.
A Necessary Reset: Realigning Roles Before It’s Too Late
If Eritrea’s opposition is to function as a national force, it must reorganize—deliberately and decisively. The path forward is clear:
Political organizations must withdraw from leadership roles inside Yiakel and BNH.
Civic movements need independence, not political guardianship.
Yiakel and BNH must retire their global and regional structures.
Nationally focused, streamlined frameworks will reduce duplication and restore accountability.
Political organizations must consolidate their work along with the EPF–ENCDC–ECDC platform.
This is the only structure with proven diplomatic credibility.
Armed groups—including BNH factions in rehabilitation—must align with a national, not regional, strategy.
Security planning cannot be outsourced to external actors.
Civic movements should return to their core strengths: mobilizing communities, educating the public, and connecting the nation.
These roles are vital—and uniquely theirs.
The Bigger Picture: A Movement in Need of Discipline
The last seven years have taught the opposition painful but necessary lessons:
Global civic structures fracture national cohesion.
Political organizations lose strength when scattered across civic platforms.
Youth movements lose independence when tied to political or financial sponsors.
Fragmentation erodes credibility—both at home and abroad.
Eritrea’s struggle for democracy cannot afford another decade of structural confusion. The public expects an opposition that is organized, coherent, and capable of national responsibility. International partners expect the same. A disciplined restructuring is not merely a policy recommendation—it is a survival requirement. If the opposition realigns its structures, clarifies its mandates, and strengthens coordination, it can finally evolve into what Eritrea desperately needs: a functional national movement prepared to guide the country toward democratic renewal.
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