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Change in Eritrea and the Limits of Betting on Ethiopia
Opinion- By Saber Rubat- October 1, 2026
Eritrean forces for change cannot ignore what is happening in Ethiopia. The conflicts and shifting alliances in the larger neighboring country may affect Eritrea’s security and stability, and influence the prospects for change within it. For this reason, engagement with Ethiopian actors becomes part of political work shaped by interests and the necessities of geography.
But Ethiopia’s importance does not mean that the future of change in Eritrea should be tied to who governs Addis Ababa, or who prevails in Tigray, Amhara, or Oromia. The problem is not in establishing relations with Ethiopian actors, but in the nature and limits of those relations. Who defines their goals and priorities? And who holds the authority to continue or end them?
Here lies the difference between political cooperation and dependency on external actors. Eritrean forces may engage with an Ethiopian party to achieve shared interests, while each side retains its own project and independent decision-making. But when they bet on the idea that the victory of that party will solve the Eritrean crisis, they tie their future to calculations they do not control, and external support shifts from being a helpful factor to becoming a condition for the success of the change project.
Recent history is full of examples illustrating the risks of such a bet. Alliances in Ethiopia and the region have shifted repeatedly; some adversaries became allies, and some allies later found themselves in opposing camps. The relationship between Asmara and Addis Ababa offers a clear example: within a few years, it moved from long-standing hostility to reconciliation and military cooperation, then back to increasing tension. These shifts remind us that an alliance that serves a national project today may change tomorrow, and should not become a condition for the project’s continuity.
Changing alliances is normal in politics. The problem begins when Eritrean forces build their strategy on the assumption that a temporary regional alliance will remain stable, or that the victory of a particular Ethiopian actor will inevitably lead to change in Eritrea. A change of government in Addis Ababa does not make change in Asmara impossible, just as the continuation of the current Ethiopian government does not guarantee it. Transformations in Ethiopia may open new opportunities or impose additional risks, but they do not exempt Eritrean forces from the responsibility of building their own project and working to achieve it.
The independence of these forces is measured by their ability to disagree with their ally when its positions conflict with Eritrea’s interests, and by their ability to continue their work if the government or balance of power in Ethiopia changes. Benefiting from a favorable regional moment is different from waiting for others to produce change. And when the ally’s calculations conflict with Eritrea’s sovereignty, territorial integrity, and independent decision-making, the priority must be clear—no matter how important the relationship may be.
The Eritrean regime does not have the right to monopolize the discourse on sovereignty or use it to silence its opponents. Opposing Isaias Afwerki’s rule does not mean abandoning national independence, and defending this independence does not mean defending his regime. Forces for change can engage in dialogue and cooperation with various Ethiopian actors without granting any of them the right to determine Eritrea’s future. They must also respect for others the same independence they demand for themselves.
For this reason, it is not enough to look at the degree of involvement in Ethiopian affairs to judge the nature of the relationship. Contacts may be extensive while decision-making remains independent, or limited while dependency on the other party is deep. Dependency appears when the calculations of Addis Ababa, Mekelle, Bahir Dar, or any other center of power begin determining the allies and adversaries of Eritrean forces, the timing of their actions or silence, and the order of their priorities. At that point, the independence of the Eritrean project itself becomes questionable.
But warning against this danger requires a practical policy to overcome it. Eritrean forces must develop a clear vision for their relations with the Ethiopian state, its institutions, and its political and social actors—one that defines what they want from these relations, what they can offer, and the areas and limits of cooperation. This policy must be rooted in Eritrean interests, away from alignment with Ethiopia’s internal conflicts or tying the change project to the fate of a particular government, region, or political current.
These relations must be based on respect for sovereignty, territorial integrity, and non-interference in internal affairs. Applying these principles requires keeping communication channels open with various parties, cooperating when interests intersect, and managing disagreements when positions diverge. Disagreement with an Ethiopian actor does not require severing ties, just as cooperation does not require supporting all its positions or aligning with its battles.
Amid the close monitoring of Ethiopian developments, the core mission of Eritrean forces for change must not recede: preparing for democratic transformation in their own country. This requires building capable political and civil institutions, formulating a shared vision for the transitional period, and presenting a clear program for the economy, education, health, water, and justice. These issues affect the lives and future of Eritreans and are no less important than knowing who advances or retreats on Ethiopian frontlines.
Preparation also includes determining how to deal with state institutions and the military, maintaining continuity of services, and preventing the collapse of the regime—if it occurs—from dragging the state into collapse. The success of change does not depend solely on removing the current authority, but on the ability of the forces demanding change to manage the next phase, establish stability, and build accountable governance under the rule of law.
The more Eritrean forces possess cohesive institutions and a shared program, the greater their ability to benefit from external relations and negotiate their interests. The absence of such work leaves them more dependent on transformations they do not control and tempts them to seek solutions from allies for problems they have not resolved within their own ranks.
The goal of change is for Eritreans to regain their right to determine their own affairs—not to replace one authority with another or transfer their decision-making from one hand to another. The change worthy of their sacrifices is the one that establishes a democratic and just state, protects its independence and social diversity, and guarantees equal rights for all its citizens without exclusion or discrimination.
